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ABSTRACT
States have considerable flexibility in determining Medicaid policies such as financial eligibility
criteria, subsidies for home- and community-based services, and reimbursements rates to skilled
nursing facilities, among other things.  An understanding of how differences in Medicaid programs
across states and time affect the elderlys' demand for Medicaid coverage of long-term care is
necessary for evaluating future changes in the Medicaid program structure.  We use data from the
1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000 waves of the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Elderly and variation
in state Medicaid policies over time to estimate our dynamic framework capturing the sequential
asset and gift decisions that determine eligibility for Medicaid.  We also model the long-term care
decisions of married and single individuals conditional on endogenous insurance coverage and health
transitions.  To control for the impact of unobserved heterogeneity in all outcomes, the structural
equations of the empirical model are estimated jointly, allowing for correlation in the error structure
across equations and over time.  In this paper we focus on the asset and gifting decisions of the
elderly over time.  We find that many of the Medicaid policy variables that differ across states have
a significant but small effect on the savings decisions of the elderly, with single elderly individuals
exhibiting more response than married elderly individuals.
Lara Gardner
Florida Atlantic University
The College of Business
Fleming West 137




University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
CB #3305, 6B Gardner Hall





At the beginning of the 21
st century an elderly person who anticipates the need for long-term 
care faces average annual costs of $35,000 to $100,000 to live in a skilled nursing facility, and 
between $7,500 and $33,444 to receive home- and community-based services.
1  Long-term care 
(LTC) services are likely to be the largest catastrophic expenses facing the elderly because most 
LTC services are not covered by Medicare or private insurance.
2  Elderly individuals and their 
families spent almost $42 billion on LTC services in 2000 while Medicaid LTC expenses 
amounted to $44 billion.  Medicaid is available only to individuals with income and assets below 
state-specific limits, and in some states, to those with medical expenses that reduce wealth below 
a qualifying limit. 
While Medicaid is available to many low-income elderly, it is increasingly becoming an option 
for the middle-class elderly due to the high costs of long-term care and increased longevity.  
Economic theory predicts that an asset-based, means-tested insurance program with a deductible 
equal to one’s wealth creates strong incentives for elderly individuals who anticipate the need for 
expensive LTC to transfer their assets in order to become eligible for Medicaid (Hubbard, et al., 
1994; Sloan, et al., 1996).  Such a transfer also allows the elderly to protect their bequeathable 
wealth.  Some eligible individuals, however, do not apply for Medicaid due to a lack of 
information and/or understanding of the Medicaid application process, or because of a stigma 
associated with receiving Medicaid payments.  In fact, if an elderly person is welfare averse, she 
may accumulate wealth instead of transferring assets, perhaps by increasing savings and 
lowering consumption.  By accumulating wealth she can pay for future medical expenses from 
                                                      
1These cost estimates are based on the MetLife Mature Market Institute Survey 2002 found at 
http://cgi.money.cnn.com/tools/elder_care/elder_care_cost_finder.html.  Louisiana has the lowest and New York, 
the highest cost. 
2Very few employer-provided health insurance plans cover long-term care.  Although private LTC insurance 
policies exist, they are very expensive and held by few elderly individuals.   3
private savings for a longer period of time and avoid dependence on Medicaid.    
This paper investigates the influences of health and the variation in state Medicaid policies on 
the savings patterns, insurance coverage, and long-term care decisions of elderly persons who 
anticipate the need for long-term care.  States have considerable flexibility in determining 
policies that affect the attractiveness of receiving Medicaid coverage for long-term care (Norton, 
2000; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990).  Although states must adhere to federal guidelines 
when designing a Medicaid program, there are large variations in Medicaid policies across states.   
 Medicaid policies are explained in Section II.  In Section III we develop a dynamic stochastic 
model that provides a framework for understanding the savings and insurance decisions and 
long-term care arrangements of elderly individuals with uncertain health paths.  We hypothesize 
that the rules for eligibility, reimbursement to providers, supply restrictions and the generosity of 
home-care programs significantly influence savings behavior and the decision to enroll in 
Medicaid.  Specific questions of interest include: 1) Do Medicaid policies have a clear impact on 
the savings patterns of elderly individuals? Are people spending down or saving when they 
perceive the need for care? 2) What are the effects of Medicaid policies on the probability of 
enrolling in Medicaid? 
To answer these questions we estimate a dynamic empirical model, detailed in Section IV, that 
captures the simultaneity and endogeneity of decision making about insurance, long-term care, 
and asset allocations over time.  The empirical model uses data from the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 
2000 waves of the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Elderly.  We also conduct simulations of 
behavior using the estimated parameters of the model to allow us to explore the effects of 
Medicaid policy changes on the choice variables.   The data are described in Section V, and in 
Section VI the estimation and simulation results are analyzed.  Section VII concludes. 
   4
II.   Background 
In February 2006 President Bush signed the Deficit Reduction Act, which changed the asset 
transfer rules for Medicaid coverage of long-term care.  The new rules reflect the 
Administration’s strong belief that middle-class and wealthy seniors are transferring assets to 
relatives to impoverish themselves, and then qualifying for Medicaid to pick up their nursing 
home bills.  Prior to the Act a person had to wait three years after transferring assets to become 
eligible for Medicaid.  Now states can look for asset transfers over the prior five years, and the 
ineligibility period does not start until one applies for Medicaid.  Also, whereas the primary 
home was not counted towards Medicaid eligibility, under the new law if you have more than 
$500,000 in home equity, you cannot qualify for Medicaid coverage.  And, if you are single and 
have Medicaid long-term care coverage, the government will supplant your children or other 
loved ones as the secondary beneficiary.  The Bush administration expects to generate $100 
million in annual savings with these measures.    
Policy-makers’ beliefs that the elderly are transferring assets to qualify for Medicaid is 
reinforced by recent theoretical work that suggests that Medicaid nursing home coverage could 
have large negative effects on the personal savings of the elderly who anticipate the need of 
nursing home care (Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan, 1996; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; 
Norton, 1995).  Studies have also found that there is little enforcement of restrictions on the 
transfer of assets, and, in fact, there exists a network of professionals to help the elderly 
successfully shield their assets from Medicaid (Moses, 1990; Sloan and Shayne, 1993). 
However, there is little empirical evidence on the extent to which the elderly actually do 
transfer assets for Medicaid eligibility.  The view that many elderly people become Medicaid 
recipients after staying in a nursing home is inconsistent with the empirical evidence that 
comparatively few persons switch to Medicaid after being admitted (Spence and Weiner, 1990;   5
Liu, Doty, and Manton, 1990).  Using data from two different samples of the elderly, Norton 
(1995) found the actual time of spend-down was much longer than a predicted time of spend-
down absent of behavioral effects, indicating that the elderly try to avoid Medicaid eligibility. 
Policy-makers are still debating proposals for altering the public financing of long-term care 
because of the high costs of LTC and the projected large growth in the number of elderly.  Over 
the next three decades the number of elderly is projected to more than double, rising from 35 
million in 2000 to more than 70 million in 2030 (Tilly, et al., 2001). This is likely to result in a 
significant increase in the demand for LTC despite recent declines in disability rates among the 
elderly.
3  The aim of recent policy proposals is to help contain costs while still helping those in 
need of assistance.  Traditionally, the strategies used by states to control Medicaid costs have 
been to tighten eligibility rules, lower payments to providers, limit supply of services, and 
eliminate coverage of services.  Yet further reductions in eligibility, reimbursement, and service 
coverage could result in many elderly persons not receiving the care they need.  An 
understanding of how changes in Medicaid rules will influence utilization and costs is therefore 
crucial to the effectiveness of proposals for changes in public financing of LTC.  Awareness of 
how current differences in Medicaid programs across states affect the demand for and supply of 
LTC, via eligibility and take up of Medicaid, will lead to better predictions of the effects of 
future changes in the Medicaid program structure. 
A.  Long-Term Care Coverage Options 
Unlike Medicare, which is a federally administered program, Medicaid is directed by each state 
under broad federal guidelines.  States determine eligibility requirements, available services, 
reimbursement rates to providers, and restrictions on construction of nursing homes.  Lack of 
Medicaid coverage can impose substantial financial burdens on low- to middle-income aged 
                                                      
3The Urban Institute predicts that the number of persons age 85 and older receiving home care services and 
institutional care will rise from 7.4 million in 2000 to 15 million in 2050 (Tilly, et al., 2001).   6
persons because Medicare and most private supplemental insurance plans do not cover long-term 
care.  Medicare covers up to a maximum of 100 days of care in a skilled nursing facility, and 
only for persons who have had a prior hospital stay that lasted at least three days.  The high costs 
of obtaining private insurance for long-term care make it unavailable to most elderly, and there 
are often barriers to coverage such as limits due to preexisting conditions.   
B.  Medicaid Benefits 
There are two mandatory benefits that must be covered by all states and two optional services.  
Nursing home care and home health care are the two mandatory benefits.
4  Medicaid influences 
the demand for these types of care by establishing eligibility policies that determine the prices of 
care, and by limiting access to care.  States also have the option of providing Medicaid coverage 
for home- and community-based services and/or personal care services.  Financial eligibility 
requirements for Medicaid programs are discussed in Section III.     
The home- and community-based services (HCBS) waiver program is the primary mechanism 
for providing Medicaid funded, community-based, long-term care services.  In response to 
criticism of Medicaid’s institutional bias, the program provides federally-matched funding and 
allows state to “waive” certain Medicaid statutory requirements so that they can expand HCBS 
and reduce the use of institutional care.  Since the primary goal of the HCBS Waiver is to offer 
alternatives to institutionalization, HCBS may only be offered to persons who meet the 
institutional level-of-care criteria.
 5  This requirement was established in response to concerns 
that long-term care expenditures might increase if many individuals who would not otherwise 
use nursing home care would use HCBS. From 1992 to 1999, Medicaid expenditures on HCBS 
                                                      
4 Federal regulations require that home health services include nursing services, home health aides, medical 
supplies, medical equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home. States have the option of providing 
additional therapeutic services under home health, including physical therapy. An individual is not required to meet 
a state’s nursing facility level-of-care criteria in order to receive home health benefits. 
5 Services covered under waiver programs usually include: case management, homemaker, home health aide, 
personal care, adult day health, habilitation, and respite care.     7
Waivers for the aged and disable increased 270% (based on HCBS data).
6  In 2000 all states had 
at least one waiver program for the aged.  
States also have a very high level of discretion to determine who will receive the other optional 
benefit, personal care services.
7  The only federal rule is that the state must make the service 
equally available to all recipients who satisfy the service criteria that have been set.  In 2000, 27 
states covered personal care services under their Medicaid state plans. 
II.  The Dynamic Behavioral Model 
A.  Overview and Timing 
In the beginning of each period an elderly individual (age 65 or older) observes her health state 
and assets from the previous period.  Given her Medicaid eligibility, an individual chooses either 
to be insured by Medicare health insurance only, to supplement it with private insurance with or 
without long-term care coverage, or to enroll in Medicaid.  Health in the current period is then 
realized and the individual decides on her long-term care arrangement and asset allocations.  The 
per-period decisions depend on endogenous previous decisions or realizations, observed 
exogenous characteristics, and relevant policy variables.  Hence the framework captures the 
dynamic optimization behavior of individuals over time. 
B.  The Per-Period Decisions 
All individuals are assumed to be covered by both Part A and Part B of Medicare.
8  Because   
Medicare covers short stays in a nursing home following a hospital stay but does not provide 
residence in a nursing home and only covers limited home health care, an elderly individual may 
                                                      
6 See http://www.hcbs.org/hcbs_data.htm 
7 Since the mid-1970s, states have had the option to offer personal care services under the Medicaid state plan. 
Personal care services may span provision of assistance not only with Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), but also 
with Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs), such as personal hygiene, light housework, laundry, meal 
preparation, transportation, grocery shopping, using the telephone, medication management, and money 
management. 
8In fact, 95% of the sample in this analysis are enrolled in the optional Part B.     8
choose to supplement this government-provided health insurance.  Each individual has the option 
to hold no additional insurance (i=0), to purchase private insurance that does not cover long-term 
care (i=1), or to purchase private insurance that does cover long-term care (i=2).  Conditional on 
her assets, she may also be eligible for Medicaid (i=3), which does cover long-term care 
arrangements. (Medicaid eligibility is discussed in detail in sub-section F.)  The individual’s 
health insurance choice determines her financial out-of-pocket responsibility for subsequent 
medical care consumption.  The indicator   if insurance alternative i is chosen in period t 
and  , otherwise.  Alternatives are mutually exclusive such that 
where I is the insurance choice set available to an individual in period t.  This choice set depends 
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Having chosen health insurance, the individual then realizes her current health state.   
Conditional on her health insurance, health, and previous assets, she decides upon her long-term 
care arrangement and allocation of current period assets.  The LTC options are no care (k=0), 
informal home care (k=1), formal home care (k=2), or nursing home care (k=3), where   
indicates that arrangement k is chosen in period t;   otherwise.  Alternatives are mutually 
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An individual chooses the amount of her assets to hold in the form of “countable assets,” which 
are used to determine if an individual meets the Medicaid asset limit.  Although what is included 
in countable, or unprotected assets,   varies slightly across states, in most cases it includes all 




An individual also chooses how much of her assets to give away as “gifts.”  This “gifts”   9
decision,   is modeled in order to capture attempts by the individual to transfer wealth to 
become eligible for Medicaid.  The variable includes gifts given to friends and relatives, money 
given to charity, and home improvements.  Thus, “gifts” are exempt from Medicaid eligibility, 
and cannot be liquidated by the individual for consumption expenditures.  This framework 
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C.  Uncertainty 
The per-period decisions depend on the history of the individual up to the current period.  This 
history defines the state at which an individual enters a new period; that is, the information that 
she has at the beginning of the period.  The endogenous state variables include health   
insurance status  , LTC arrangement  , and countable assets   in the previous period.
, 1 − t h
i
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u
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10  
A vector of demographic characteristics that are assumed to be exogenous,   including age, 
gender, race, ethnicity, education, marital status, and an indicator for a change in marital status 
from married to single, is also known at the beginning of the period.  We also assume that the 
individual knows all prices, 
, t X






t t t O p p p r P =  which are defined below.  Individuals are 
                                                      
9Although a home is generally not counted towards Medicaid eligibility, the home is technically subject to 
transfer prohibitions; a person entering a nursing home is allowed to transfer his/her home only to a spouse, minor or 
disabled child, or in some circumstances, sibling or adult child.  Previous research suggests that most elderly persons 
hold the majority of their savings in the form of housing (Venti and Wise, 1991).  Housing assets are not used to 
determine Medicaid eligibility before Feb. 2006.  Other types of savings that are protected from Medicaid include 
life insurance, burial plot, and car value up to some small amount.  Of these protected assets, housing value 
comprises the largest proportion.  For the purpose of this analysis, variations in housing value is taken as given.  
That is, the model does not explicitly allow for the individual’s decision to sell (or buy) a home and housing wealth 
is not included in the measurement of assets. Previous research documents that persons 65 and over simply do not 
move very often (Venti and Wise 1989a, 1989b).  In the AHEAD data, 75% of the sample own a home at the start of 
the survey (1993).  Of these, less than 4% (who are still alive in 2000) sold their homes.   
10The length of time an individual has received a particular type of LTC could also influence the physical and 
emotional transaction costs involved in switching to a new long-term care arrangement.  For example, the search 
costs of finding a provider of formal home care or institutional care, or the comfort established with an informal 
provider, may inhibit the search for formal and/or institutional care.  Or, if an individual has received any type of 
care over a significant period of time she may develop a dependence on care and therefore be unwilling (or unable) 
to function without such help.  Because the data set used for the empirical analysis does not provide this information 
prior to the initial survey, we do not formally include duration in a particular LTC arrangement as a state variable.     10
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Health evolves each period and is stochastic. The period t health state is denoted   taking on 
values 0 to H, where increasing values indicate worsening health.  For simplicity of exposition, 
let   indicate good health,   indicate bad health, and 
, t h
0 = t h 1 = t h 2 = t h  indicate death.  Conditional 
on survival to period t, the probability of health state   in period t is    h






t X d d h h h p − − = =                                        (1) 
and is modeled as a time-varying Markov probability of transitioning from one health state to 
another health state that depends on individual demographic factors and decisions made in the 
previous period.  The probability of death at the end of period t (i.e., of not surviving to period 
t+1),  , 1 + t γ  is defined similarly as 




t t t X d h d h p = = + + γ                                                      (2) 
The type of long-term care a person received in the previous period,  , may impact current 
period health.  If an elderly individual needs help with bathing, walking, eating or other ADLs, 
she may hurt herself by not receiving the required care.  For example, she may fall while trying 
to walk or trying to enter/exit a bathtub alone.  A care provider can also help an elderly person to 
properly take medications, which would influence health.  The dependence of the health 
probability on the insurance choice,  , is intended to capture the effect of other endogenous 
medical care inputs which are affected by insurance coverage.   
k
t d 1 −
i
t d
There is also a random shock to health that is unobserved at the beginning of the period.  The 
shock to health occurs after the insurance decision, so in each period t the choice of insurance is 
based on expectations of health shocks in the period.  After the health state has been observed,   11
the LTC arrangement and assets decisions are made and the individual then updates expectations 
of future health shocks and observes transitions in the state variables.  Conditional on these 
transitions and updated expectations, the individual repeats the decision process in the next 
period, if she survives.   
D.  Per-Period Utility and Budget Constraint 
An individual derives utility directly from the choice of long-term care arrangement, gifts, and 
consumption, conditional on the insurance choice.  Utility is a function of these observables and 
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 is determined in the budget constraint below.  She first chooses health insurance which 
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t d p  is the price (or 
premium) associated with insurance choice i.  She then allocates this cash on hand to her chosen 
long-term care arrangement (whose prices depend on insurance status) and savings, gifts, and 
consumption.  Her budget is also reduced by exogenous out-of-pocket medical expenses ( ) t O  
that are determined by health status and health insurance coverage.  The budget constraint is 
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where   and   are the individual’s costs of home care and nursing home care at time t, 
respectively.  These prices are a function of the parameters of the insurance plan i.  The gifts 








E.  The Optimization Problem 
To reiterate, an individual chooses insurance at the beginning of the period, based on health   12
and other events in the previous period.  Health in the current period is then realized and the 
individual makes the LTC choice and asset allocations.  Utility is a function of these variables, 
consumption, and an error term that is specific to the health, long-term care arrangement, and 
asset decisions.   
Conditional on the choice of health insurance and the health state realization, the objective of 
an individual is to choose the type of long-term care arrangement and asset allocation so as to 
maximize her expected present discounted value (EPDV) of lifetime utility, subject to her budget 
constraint. The value of choosing long-term care arrangement k and asset allocation u and g in 
period t, conditional on health insurance   and health in period t,   is  
i
t d , t h
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where  β  is the discount factor and   is the probability of survival to period t+1.  If the 
individual dies, she receives the value of death which may be a function of her assets, 
1 + t γ
( ) t z B .  
This formulation allows for a bequest motive among the elderly.  If she survives, her future value 
of lifetime utility,   captures the subsequent insurance decision, health transitions, and 
long-term care, gifts and assets decisions.  More specifically, the maximal value of lifetime 
utility in period t, conditional on insurance and health, is 
() , t z W








t t ∀ ∀ = − , , , , , | , max , | 1 ε
            (6) 
where   is the expectations operator over the distribution of    The value of choosing 
health insurance option i at the beginning of the period is 
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where   represents preferences for insurance and   represents health transition 
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                                               (8) 
The insurance decision represented by  ( ) t z W  embeds the availability of Medicaid as an 
insurance option.  The individual’s choices in previous periods interact with the Medicaid policy 
variables to determine eligibility.     
The effects of the Medicaid policy variables and other exogenous variables on the outcomes of 
interest are difficult to derive because they depend (importantly) on the history of the many 
(discrete and continuous) choices.  In Section VI, we describe results from a series of simulations 
that predict an individual’s per-period decisions under various Medicaid policy changes.  By 
evaluating changes in the outcomes of interest under various Medicaid policy scenarios, we 
recover the unconditional impact of Medicaid policies on the outcomes of interest.  
F.  Eligibility for Medicaid 
A person living in state s must meet either the categorically needy or medically needy income 
and asset limits to be eligible for Medicaid.  These state-determined asset limits may be different 
for the categorically needy and the medically needy programs. Also, the financial eligibility 
requirements for the mandatory services, nursing home and home care, are identical, but the 
financial eligibility requirements for the HCBS Waivers can be the same or different from the 
financial eligibility requirements for the mandatory services. 
To be eligible for a state’s categorically needy program, income must be below the income 
limit for the categorically needy, 
cat
s t Y ,  (for state s in time t) and assets must be below the state 
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However, if an elderly person has income or assets that exceed the categorically needy limits,   14
she may still qualify for Medicaid if the state has a medically needy program.
11  Eligibility for 
Medicaid in a state that does have a medically needy program also requires that assets are below 






t A A ≤  but the income requirements are more complicated.  A 
medically needy program allows the individual to deduct medical expenses from income to 
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= =  where   are out-of-pocket medical expenses 
related to formal home care, nursing home care, and other medical expenses, respectively.  If a 
state does not have a medically needy program, individuals with income above the categorically 
needy income threshold are ineligible for Medicaid even if they do not have enough income to 
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In addition to the financial eligibility requirements, to be eligible for HCBS elderly individuals 
must meet institutional level-of-care criteria.
13  This is a statutory requirement added by 
Congress in part to address concern about the cost of expanding HCBS: states must demonstrate 
that they are providing waiver services only to people who are eligible for institutional 
placement. 
Although the financial eligibility requirements for HCBS Waivers are important in determining 
the use of HCBS, studies have suggested that Medicaid policies that most influence the demand 
for home care under HCBS waiver coverage are the number of persons a state covers under a 
waiver and the amount of income and assets a person or couple may retain while receiving 
                                                      
11Asset and income limits for both the categorically needy and the medically needy programs in each state are 
detailed in Appendix Table A1. 
12States that do not have a medically needy program are required to allow elderly persons to establish a Miller Trust, 
which is designed for those whose income is over the income limit, but who do not receive enough monthly income 
to pay for nursing care costs.  Although this is available, few elderly use this option (Taylor, Sloan, and Norton, 
1999). 
13 Level-of-care criteria explicitly describe the type and level of functional limitations or needs an individual must 
have in order to be admitted to an institutional setting.  These criteria usually include measures of need for 
assistance with Activities of Daily Living (dressing, eating, bathing, toileting, walking, in/out of bed) and for other 
services, including nursing and medically related services.     15
HCBS coverage.  In every state, once eligibility for HCBS Waivers is determined, the state then 
calculates how much income and assets the individual may retain based on the state’s maximum 
limits.  These ‘maintenance needs allowances (MNAs)’ vary significantly across states.  States’ 
MNAs are shown in the first column of Appendix Table A2.  
IV.  The Empirical Specification 
A.  Equation System 
An individual maximizes lifetime utility subject to the budget constraints and borrowing 
constraints.  The individual’s observed decisions are expected to be the ones that jointly provide 
the greatest EPDV of lifetime utility (equations 5 and 7 from Section III).  From (7) and the 
assumption that   enters additively and has an Extreme Value distribution, 
i
t ε () t
i
z W  is the 
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() t
i
z W  can be approximated by an   order Taylor series expansion of its argument    In 
order to consider permanent and time-varying heterogeneity that may influence the insurance 
decision as well as other decisions and health transitions in the model, we decompose the error 
term   into three components.  More specifically,    where 
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represent permanent and time-varying individual unobservables, respectively, and  i 1 ρ  and  i 1 ω  
are factor loadings on the heterogeneity terms.  Also,    is the remaining i.i.d. Extreme Value 
distributed error.     
i
t u
If people are modifying their behavior to satisfy eligibility criteria, as the model suggests, then   16
ignoring the endogeneity of eligibility may bias results.  Thus, it is more appropriate to model the 
decision to participate in Medicaid in each period only for persons who are eligible for 
Medicaid.
14  All persons who choose not to enroll in Medicaid would choose among the other 
insurance options only.  Thus, we estimate insurance probabilities for i = 0, 1, 2 as in Equation 
(4), conditional on not enrolling in Medicaid.   () t
i
z W  is approximated as 
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where   and   are endogenous lagged health and assets,   is a vector of Medicaid policy 
variables that influence the expected financial benefits of eligibility and access to care in state s, 
 is a vector of demographic variables assumed to be exogenous: marital status, age, gender, 
race, education, an indicator for a change in marital status, and number of children, and   is an 
indicator for Medicaid eligibility based on assets at the end of the current period.  Unobserved 
permanent and time-varying individual heterogeneity is captured by 
1 − t h
u
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Unobserved heterogeneity is likely to influence insurance decisions as well as decisions 
regarding long-term care arrangement, gifts, and savings.  Similarly, it may affect health 
transitions.  For example, an individual who is highly risk averse will be more likely to buy long-
                                                      
14Because of the two or three year lag between waves in the AHEAD data, basing eligibility for Medicaid on lagged 
asset levels is potentially incorrect.  That is, some individuals spend down their assets between waves and hence 
become eligible during the two or three year gap.  Individuals in the sample report receiving Medicaid coverage at 
time t, when asset levels in t-1 are above the Medicaid eligibility limit.  Hence, we include all individuals in the 
equation capturing the Medicaid participation decision.  Those who did not enroll in Medicaid face the other three 
insurance options.  We include a dummy variable indicating Medicaid eligibility (according to lagged assets) in the 
multinomial insurance equation.     17
term care insurance and to save more.  Or an individual may have unobserved knowledge of her 
genetic disposition that influences her decisions.  If someone anticipates failing health, she may 
also expect to be unable to manage her personal finances in the future, and to need significant 
long-term care.  Thus she may give gifts to her children to acquire informal care and/or as a way 
of qualifying for Medicaid to cover long-term care expenses.  Hence, health insurance 
probabilities are estimated jointly with health, survival and long-term care probabilities, and gift 
and asset levels.    
Although health is described in the behavioral model as being dichotomous, the data provide 
enough information to model health as a continuous variable.  The health variable used in this 
analysis is an index constructed from a raw score of the total difficulty with Activities of Daily 
Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs): one point for a difficulty 
with an IADL and two points for a difficulty with an ADL.  The raw score is converted to an 
index by taking the log of values created by the formula: 10*(respondent’s score)/(highest score–
lowest score).
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where   is an independent and identically distributed error term.  The insurance choice and 
long-term care arrangement in the previous period are endogenous explanatory variables.  The 
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Conditional on insurance and health, the individual chooses a long-term care arrangement.  The 
probability that in individual chooses LTC alternative k is  
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B.  Likelihood Function 
The likelihood function for individual n reflects the probabilities of the observed insurance 
choice, the observed health state conditional on being alive, the observed LTC arrangement, 
asset allocation, and death over the four waves of the survey.    is the number of periods the 
person is alive, or observed in the sample.  Conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity, the 
contribution to the likelihood function of individual n at time period t is  
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where   is the vector of parameters to be estimated,  Θ ( ) ρ λ ϕ δ β α , , , , , = Θ ,   and  () () , , ⋅ ⋅ u f () ⋅ g  are 
continuous density functions,   if individual n is on insurance plan i at time t, and   if 
individual n chooses long-term care alternative k in period t. 
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Significant correlation in unobservable individual traits and preferences across the decision   19
variables and health presents itself as correlation among the errors in each equation, causing 
coefficients on endogenous explanatory variables to be biased if the correlation is unaccounted 
for.  We approximate the unknown distribution of the heterogeneity with a discrete step function 
and “integrate out” with a weighted sum of probabilities.  This discrete factor method, developed 
by Heckman and Singer (1984) and later extended to simultaneous systems by Mroz and Guilkey 
(1992) and Mroz (1999), imposes no distributional assumptions on the unobservables.  Instead, it 
approximates the distribution of the heterogeneity by a finite number of mass points and 
probability weights that are estimated jointly with the other parameters of the model.   
The analysis uses a panel data set collected on the same individuals from the AHEAD in 1993, 
1995, 1998, and 2000.  Since information on the state variables that explain observed decision 
variables in 1993 are unavailable, the 1993 information will serve as initial conditions ( ). 0 = t   
Initial conditions for health, insurance choice, LTC arrangement, and assets must be modeled 
since the period   decisions depend on these values.  These initial conditions are modeled as 
reduced form equations and depend on the unobserved permanent heterogeneity 
t
μ .  Let 
() μ ρ ϑ c c c R 0 , , Ι  represent the probability of observing the value of the c
th initial condition, where 
 is a vector of explanatory variables, including valid exclusion restrictions,  R c ϑ  is the parameter 
vector, and  c 0 ρ is the factor loading on μ .  Thus, the likelihood function for each individual n 
unconditional on the unobserved error components μ  and  t υ  is 
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where  a θ  is the vector of probabilities on the A points of support of the heterogeneity 
distribution for the permanent unobservable, and  b θ  is the vector of probabilities in the B  points   20
of support of the distribution of the time-varying heterogeneity.
16  The likelihood function for a 
sample of size N is 
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V.  Description of Data 
The data for this project are from the 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000 waves of the Assets and 
Health Dynamics of the Elderly (AHEAD).  The AHEAD survey is a national panel survey 
composed of households in which the head of household is at least 70 years of age.  We observe 
three transitions, from 1993 to 1995, 1995 to 1998, and 1998 to 2000.  The initial survey data, in 
1993, are treated as initial conditions. 
Included in the analysis are individuals who: 1) provide a core interview all four waves; or 2) 
provided a core interview in periods when alive and surviving relatives answer the exit survey in 
the year the individual dies.
17  Observations that do not meet criteria 1) or 2) are dropped so that 
a continuous panel of observations can be constructed.  Out of 8,449 persons, there are 7,004 that 
meet these criteria.  Also dropped are the 162 persons under age 65 and 35 persons who are 
missing health data in all waves.  After these deletions there are 6,807 persons, for a total of 
25,011 person-period observations.   
A.  Individual Variables 
Summary statistics for decision variables, by health category, are shown in Table 1.  Additional 
information on the sample, not shown in the table, reveals that in 1995 12.0% of the sample is 
                                                      
16 There is no determinant method for choosing the number of points of support for each type of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  The final specification is chosen by observing the change in estimates and the likelihood function 
value as more points of support are added.  The final specification for this model has one permanent and one time-
varying factor, where the permanent factor has four points of support and the time-varying factor has three points of 
support.  Identification issues are discussed in Appendix A. 
17If an individual dies between waves, the AHEAD sample design provides for exit interviews with a surviving 
spouse, child, or other informant. Of the 6,807 persons included in this analysis, there is a 22% rate of attrition due 
to death from 1993 to 2000.   21
enrolled on Medicaid, while these numbers rise to 12.8% and 14.3% in 1998 and 2000, 
respectively.  The percent of persons receiving each type of long-term care is very similar among 
those with no insurance and private insurance.  That is, in 1998 the percent of people receiving 
paid home care without insurance, with private insurance without long-term care coverage and 
with private insurance with long-term care coverage is 10.0%, 8.6%, and 9.6%, respectively; and 
the percent of people living in a nursing home in the same insurance categories is 5.3%, 6.0%, 
and 4.5%.  Yet, of persons enrolled on Medicaid, 15.5% are receiving paid home care and 27.4% 
are living in a nursing home.
18  
AHEAD asks detailed questions on the type and quantity of long-term care.  Individuals who 
were in a nursing home in the first wave were not included in the survey. However, at 
subsequent waves, Wave 1 respondents who are institutionalized continue to be interviewed.  
Overall, 5.6% of the sample lives in a nursing home in 1995, 11.5% in 1998, and 13.5% in 2000.   
The asset variables in the AHEAD are collected at the household level.  However, one can 
distinguish assets of the elderly couple (person) in the household from the assets of other 
household members.  Our measure of unprotected assets is the sum of stocks, bonds, savings 
accounts, business assets, checking and CD accounts, trusts, IRAs, value of secondary real 
estate, and other assets, minus all debts.  In the empirical model, any person reporting negative 
assets is assigned a value of zero assets.  Our gifts measures include gifts made to children, 
grand-children, friends and others in the preceding year and gifts to charity.  We model both the 
probability of any assets (and any gifts) and the level of assets (or gifts), if any.   
B.  Eligibility Policy Variables   
The policy variables used in estimation are defined in Table 2.  We differentiate between 
                                                      
18Individuals are coded as having received formal or informal care in the community only if they received care at 
least twice a week (on average).  Formal care is paid and informal care is unpaid.  A person is also coded as having 
received informal care if she received help with three or more ADLS on a regular basis.   22
policy variables that determine eligibility for Medicaid and those that affect availability and 
quality of Medicaid services for the elderly in a state.  Our measure of the generosity of 
Medicaid’s eligibility rules for nursing home care follows Gruber’s (Currie, 1996; Gruber, 1999) 
measure in his work on single women and children.  We model the impact of Medicaid’s 
eligibility criteria for nursing home care by determining the amount of expected nursing home 
expenditures that would be covered by the Medicaid program for a given household, in a given 
state and time period.  Specifically, for each person, we determine a likelihood of being eligible 
for nursing home care that is a function of the legislative environment in a state and year but not 
related to the demographics of that state (NH Eligibility).
19  Then we proxy the benefits of 
eligibility by the average cost of nursing home care in a state and year.  The final measure (NH 
Generosity) is the probability of nursing home eligibility multiplied by the expected spending on 
care for two years (based on the fact that there are two years between the AHEAD survey 
waves).  This measure of eligibility dollars will vary across households due to differences in state 
eligibility rules that differ by household characteristics, and the average costs of care in the state.   
We use two variables to capture the theory that persons who hold assets that are closer to the 
asset limit may be more (or less) willing to dispose of assets in order to become eligible for 
Medicaid.  These are the log amount of assets that one would have to spend/transfer or otherwise 
dispose of in period   in order to be eligible for Medicaid nursing home coverage in period   
(NH $ Loss), and the log amount of assets calculated similarly for Medicaid HCBS coverage 
(HCBS $ Loss).   
1 − t t
Within each state the asset limit depends on marital status.  If an individual is single the asset 
                                                      
19 For each year we categorize the entire sample by the four education categories in Table 1.  Then we compute the 
eligibility of all persons for each state’s rules in that year.  The average eligibility is then measured in each marital 
status/education/age/state/cell to get a cell-specific eligibility measure.  Thus for each year there is an average 
eligibility by state, marital status, education level and age category.  These averages are then assigned to the whole 
sample.  There are four age categories used for this procedure: 70-76, 76-81, 81-85, and over 85.   23
limit is the standard limit for singles shown in Appendix Table A1.  However, if the elderly 
individual who is applying for Medicaid is married, he/she may transfer a specified amount of 
assets to the spouse (if the spouse is not also applying for Medicaid).  After transferring assets to 
his/her spouse, the elderly individual who is applying for Medicaid may not have assets higher 
than the asset limit for single individuals.  For example, if the asset limit for a single individual is 
$2,000, and the maximum spousal protection limit is $87,000, the asset limit for the spouse 
applying for care is $2,000 + $87,000, since the non-Medicaid spouse can retain up to $87,000.     
An important policy issue in a state’s provision of HCBS is to ensure that a Medicaid recipient 
and spouse, if present, have enough wealth to live on after their contribution (if any) to home 
care.  If single, the policy variables that determine the amount of wealth one can retain while 
receiving Medicaid coverage are the asset limit for HCBS eligibility and an income 
‘maintenance needs allowance (MNA).’  For example, suppose that the   in state s at time 
t is $400 and the income limit is $1,200.  Also, the price of home- and community-based care per 
month is $800.  A person who has an income of $1,100 per month must spend $700 
s t MNA,
( ) s t MNA, 1100 $ − .  After the individual has paid $700, Medicaid will cover the rest of the cost of 
care, which is $100 (i.e., $800 - $700).     
If married, the elderly individual receiving Medicaid HCBS coverage may keep up to the asset 
limit and   and the spouse may keep up to the maximum protected spousal income and up 
to the maximum spousal protection asset limit; these limits are shown in Appendix Table A2.  
Our policy variable, the ‘HCBS $ Allowable’ was constructed in the same manner as Medicaid 
NH eligibility for nursing home care: the residual wealth is computed for each person for each 
state’s policies in each year.  Then the average residual wealth for each marital status/education/ 
age/state/cell is assigned to the entire sample for their specific state of residence.  HCBS $ Loss 
, ,s t MNA  24
is analogous to NH $ Loss and is the amount of income and assets an individual would have to 
lose to become eligible for Medicaid HCBS.  
C.  Supply-Side Policy Variables 
States also influence the availability and quality of nursing home care by setting 
reimbursement rates to providers and by enforcing Certificate of Need (CON) restrictions and/or 
moratoriums that restrict the construction of nursing home beds at the state level.
20  The number 
of nursing home beds per 1000 persons age 65 and over captures the effect of any limitation on 
supply of nursing home beds (Beds/1000 Elderly).  In 1998 the number of beds per 1000 elderly 
ranged from 20 in West Virginia to 79 in Indiana, as seen in Appendix Table A3. 
Appendix Table A3 also lists the Medicaid and out-of-pocket payment rates to nursing homes 
in 1998, across states.  As discussed in previous literature, Medicaid reimburses nursing facilities 
at a rate below the private-pay and Medicare payment rate to help lower Medicaid costs of 
nursing home care (Wiener, 1996; Gertler, 1992).  This discrepancy could lead to access and 
quality problems for Medicaid patients.  Empirical evidence has suggested that as the payment 
differential between private pay and Medicaid patients widens, access problems worsen for 
Medicaid beneficiaries (Ettner, 1993; Hoerger et al, 1996).  
We define a measure of the difference between out-of-pocket costs and Medicaid payment 
rates for nursing home care (NH Revenue Loss).  This nursing home revenue loss is an 
individual-specific measure of the difference between the revenues a nursing home would 
receive if a person never qualified for nursing home care, and the nursing home’s projected 
                                                      
20 The premise of Certificate of Need or moratorium restrictions as a method of cost-control is based on Roemer’s 
Law, which holds that the availability of open-ended, third-party reimbursement allows demand for health care 
services to expand to meet whatever supply is available (Wiener et al., 1998).  Thus, if a nursing home bed is built, 
there is a significant probability that it will be filled by a Medicaid patient, which will lead to higher program costs.  
Research evidence also suggests a significantly positive relationship between nursing home use and the ratio of 
number of nursing home beds to the elderly population (Hoerger et al., 1996; Greene and Ondrich, 1990; Liu et al., 
1991; Greene et al., 1993).   25
revenues if a person becomes eligible for nursing home care during a stay (one wave of the 
AHEAD data covers two years).  This measure of revenue loss takes into account when the 
person would become eligible, predicted probabilities that a person will be alive in each period 
from a hazard analysis, and Medicaid’s nursing home reimbursement rates in the state.
21    
The financial eligibility requirements for mandatory home health services and the personal care 
option are identical to those for nursing home care, so we model the generosity of a state’s 
expenditures on these two services as the ratio of total spending on home health and personal 
care to the total amount of spending on nursing home care (HH + Personal $/NH$).   
The HCBS waiver program is the primary mechanism for providing Medicaid funded, 
community-based, long-term care services.  States’ determination of the number of persons to 
cover under a waiver is an important factor in the availability of home care services.  To 
approximate the availability of HCBS Waiver programs for the elderly, we use the average 
HCBS expenditure per eligible elderly person in the state (HCBS $/Elig. Elderly).  We proxy 
eligibility with receipt of Supplementary Security Income.   
Although Medicare only covers short stays in a nursing home and limited home health 
services, there is one aspect of Medicare coverage of home health that is important in the context 
of this study.
22  In October 1997 there was a substantial change in Medicare’s reimbursement 
policy which has been associated with a large decline in the provision of home care (McKnight, 
2002).  The reimbursement policy change involved the imposition of average per-patient 
reimbursement caps to home health care agencies.
23  This policy change could give home health 
                                                      
21 There also may be a perception by individuals that they could not get into a nursing home under Medicaid 
coverage.  This measure assumes no spend-down or saving behavior by the individual.   
22 Medicare covers care in a skilled nursing facility for up to 100 days, and only for persons who need a skilled level 
of care and who have had a prior hospital stay that lasted at least 3 days.  Although Medicare does not require a co-
payment for the first 20 days in a nursing home, after the first 20 days the co-payments ($97 a day in 2000) are not 
very different from the out-of-pocket cost of care in many facilities.   
23 In particular, caps were constructed as a weighted average of the historical costs per home care user in each 
agency and the mean historical costs per home care user in each agency’s census division.     26
agencies an incentive to reduce per-patient costs. To control for the effects of this change in 
Medicare reimbursement to home health care agencies, we include the change in Medicare’s 
average payment per patient from the previous period, by state, interacted with a dummy variable 
indicating the post-policy period (Medicare $ Change).  Thus, for 1995 this variable is zero.  
Medicare payment information is from the National Association for Home Care and Hospice 
Organization.
24  
VI.  Results 
Tables 3a – 3c show selected coefficient estimates from the heterogeneity model.
25  Due to the 
underlying dynamics of the model, interpretation of these point estimates is difficult but signs 
and significance provide some information about the effects of each variable.  To provide a 
better understanding of the effects of variables we also present the impacts of simulated changes 
in state Medicaid policy variables from 1995 to 2000 in Table 5. 
There are many questions that could be explored with this model.  In this paper, our discussion 
focuses on the original objectives posed in the introduction: What are the primary determinants 
of asset levels and choice of insurance; and what is the relative importance of Medicaid policies 
in the dynamic decision-making related to these outcomes.   
A.  Medicaid 
According to the results in Tables 3a–3c, persons who are enrolled in Medicaid are more likely 
to be enrolled in Medicaid the following period, relative to those with no supplemental 
insurance, are more likely to be receiving formal home care or nursing home care than no care, 
are less likely to have assets or give gifts, and have lower assets, if any.  All results are 
significant within a reasonable level, and consistent with previous literature and the theory in 
                                                      
24 http://www.nahc.org/NAHC/LegReg/Crisis/crisishh.html 
25 Results for all coefficient estimates are available from the authors upon request.   27
Section III.
26  The effects of Medicaid policy variables on Medicaid enrollment and other choice 
variables are discussed below.      
B.  Assets 
Assets from the previous period affect the insurance, long-term care, and asset and gift 
equations quadratically.  Overall the signs of the estimates are as expected: lag assets are 
negatively related to Medicaid enrollment; negatively related to receiving informal home care or 
nursing home care; and positively related to asset and gift levels. Lag assets have no significant 
effect on formal home care.  In Table 3b, lower asset levels are significantly related to receiving 
Medicaid coverage or having worse health, as are the following demographic characteristics (not 
shown): female, Hispanic, non-white, single, lower education levels, and higher numbers of 
children.      
C.  Medicaid Eligibility Policies 
Medicaid Nursing Home Generosity 
NH Generosity has a positive effect on the probability of Medicaid enrollment, significant at 
the one percent level.  In Table 3b, this generosity also has a significantly positive effect on the 
probability of holding positive assets and continuous asset levels, and an insignificant effect on 
gifts.  These results could be interpreted as follows:  Higher values of NH Generosity result from 
a combination of more generous Medicaid eligibility rules and higher costs of nursing home 
care.  In states that have more generous eligibility rules relative to other states, people are 
allowed to qualify for Medicaid while holding higher asset levels. Thus, persons in states with 
more generous eligibility rules may choose to hold as high of assets as allowed under Medicaid 
coverage.  In other words, these results may suggest that if persons are allowed to hold more 
                                                      
26 Not shown is that persons who are Hispanic, non-white, older, or single are more likely to be enrolled in 
Medicaid; these results are also consistent with previous literature.   28
wealth under Medicaid coverage, they will choose to do so.
27   
HCBS Dollars Allowable 
The average dollar amount of income and assets one may retain while receiving Medicaid 
HCBS coverage is insignificantly related to the probability of Medicaid enrollment.  This 
supports previous arguments discussed in Section II that the availability of HCBS coverage 
within a state, rather than the HCBS financial eligibility rules, may be more relevant to the 
Medicaid enrollment decision.  Although the retained wealth allowable under HCBS coverage is 
significantly positively related to the probability of holding positive assets, it is significantly 
negatively related to continuous asset levels.  Whereas Medicaid nursing home generosity 
encouraged people to hold more assets, Medicaid home care generosity has a negative 
relationship with assets. This indicates that spend-down behavior for HCBS eligibility could be 
present – as people are allowed to hold more wealth under HCBS coverage, that coverage is 
more appealing and people spend down to improve their chances of eligibility.   
Dollar Loss Variables 
The nursing home and HCBS dollar losses are constructed as the difference between lag assets 
and the Medicaid asset limits for nursing home care and HCBS, respectively. Our theory 
suggests that persons whose assets were closer to the eligibility limits in the previous period 
would be more likely to be enrolled in Medicaid in the current period.  However, both dollar loss 
measures are insignificantly related to the probability of Medicaid enrollment.  This does not 
suggest that spend down behavior may not be occurring, but that those persons currently enrolled 
in Medicaid held a wide range of assets in the previous period. This may also be a reflection of 
the two to three year gap in the data between last period’s observable assets and current period 
enrollment in Medicaid. 
                                                      
27 We thank the seminar participants at University of Canterbury for drawing our attention to this possibility.    29
The individual-specific dollar loss necessary for Medicaid eligibility for nursing home care, 
based on assets in the previous period, is significantly positively related to asset levels and 
negatively to gifts.  In contrast, the dollar loss necessary for Medicaid HCBS eligibility is 
significantly negatively related to asset levels and positively related to gifts.  An example may 
help to interpret the meaning of these coefficients.  Consider two single individuals living in two 
different states.  Both have assets of $15,000 in period t.
28  The person in state a faces an asset 
limit of $10,000 while the person in state b faces an asset limit of $2,000.  Assume both are 
eligible based on income eligibility and level-of-care requirements.  The person in state a faces a 
dollar loss of $5,000 in order to obtain Medicaid eligibility, while the person in state b faces a 
$13,000 dollar loss in order to obtain Medicaid eligibility.  If we view these asset limits as the 
resource standards for nursing home coverage, then the person in state a, who has less assets to 
lose in order to qualify for Medicaid, will hold less assets in the current period (since there is a 
positive relationship between nursing home dollar loss and asset levels).  This suggests that 
persons who have less assets to lose in order to obtain Medicaid coverage of nursing home care 
in period t, will choose to hold less assets in period t+1; in other words, persons who face 
relatively higher asset limits may lower assets in order to qualify for Medicaid. 
On the other hand, if we view these asset limits as resource standards for HCBS coverage, then 
the person in state a is more likely to hold higher assets in the current period.  This could be 
interpreted as saying that people who are closer to obtaining Medicaid eligibility (dollar loss for 
obtaining eligibility is lower), will hold higher asset levels.   
Why would the individual-specific measure of dollar loss necessary for HCBS coverage have a 
negative effect on asset levels when the average measures of HCBS generosity have the opposite 
effects?  Perhaps the answer is related to the fact that in many states the elderly are on waiting 
                                                      
28 Note that both lag assets and lag assets squared are included in the estimation, thus controlling for assets in the 
previous period.     30
lists for HCBS coverage.  That is, their state of residence has an HCBS waiver program for the 
aged, but it only covers a limited number of persons and when that limit is met, remaining 
applicants must wait for eligibility.  Thus, on average, states that have more generous eligibility 
and residual wealth rules will see elderly lower asset levels, given the negative coefficient on 
average HCBS generosity within a state in the asset equation; but individually, an elderly person 
will not want to lower assets to the low levels necessary for Medicaid HCBS eligibility until that 
coverage is available.  In fact, the summary statistics in Table 1 show that the percentage of 
people in our sample reporting poor health increases with time, but the percent with Medicaid 
remains fairly constant. 
D.  Medicaid Supply-Side Variables 
Nursing Home 
In Table 3a, the number of beds per elderly within a state is significantly positively related to 
Medicaid enrollment and the probability of living in a nursing home (relative to no care); and 
significantly negatively related to asset levels.  Greater nursing home revenue losses, indicating 
lower Medicaid reimbursement rates relative to private pay costs, are significantly negatively 
related to the probability of receiving Medicaid coverage, as expected, but have an insignificant 
effect on the probability of nursing home care and are significantly negatively related to asset 
and gift levels.  Theory indicates that as the nursing home revenue loss decreases, the probability 
of Medicaid enrollment would increase, as the estimates increase. As this occurs individuals 
should lower asset levels, perhaps by increasing gift levels, in order to receive Medicaid 
coverage. Although gift levels do increase as the revenue loss decreases, why assets increase is 
unclear. 
Home- and Community-Based Services (HCBS)   31
Both of the supply variables for Medicaid home care, the ratio of spending on home care to 
nursing home care and HCBS spending per eligible elderly, have a significantly positive 
relationship with Medicaid enrollment, as predicted.  Although the long-term care ratio has a 
significantly positive relationship with the receipt of paid home care and significantly negative 
relationships with asset and gifts levels, the average HCBS spending is insignificantly related to 
these both receipt of paid home care and asset levels.   
E.  Simulations 
Given our estimated dynamic structural model we conduct several simulations in order to 
investigate the impacts of the policy variables on behavior over time.  The simulation procedure 
involves random assignment of permanent heterogeneity at the beginning of 1995 and she retains 
this assignment all subsequent periods.  We also randomly draw from the time-varying 
heterogeneity distribution at the beginning of 1995, 1998, and 2000 for each person.  Based on 
the point estimates in each equation, each individual’s observed explanatory variables, and the 
random draws from the i.i.d. error distributions, as well as the unobserved permanent and time-
varying individual heterogeneity distributions, predictions are made for the 1995 values of 
Medicaid, insurance, health, long-term care, assets, gifts, and deceased outcomes sequentially, 
accounting for current period realizations that influence subsequent current period choices (i.e., 
current period health affects current period long-term care utilization).  Using these simulated 
outcomes, we then recalculate each individual’s Medicaid eligibility status
29 and, depending on 
the policy simulation, policy variables for 1998.  We also update the endogenous right-hand side 
variables for 1998 based on the simulated outcomes from 1995.  The same procedure is followed 
from 1998 to 2000.  We perform 50 replications of each individual observed in our sample in 
1995.  Outcomes are averaged over all person replications alive in the year of interest. 
                                                      
29The Medicaid eligibility status must be re-calculated because a dummy variable equal to one if Medicaid eligible is 
included in the insurance equation.    32
Before discussing the results of changes in policy variables, we present how accurately the 
model predicts the observed outcomes.  In Table 4, we show the observed averages from the 
data, simulated behavior obtained with the above method without updating the right-hand side 
variables (i.e., using observed values of all right-hand side variables), simulated behavior when 
right-hand side variables are updated (i.e., using simulated values of all right-hand side 
variables),
 and simulations by mass point.
30  The model fits the observed outcomes quite well.  
For dichotomous variables most of the updated simulations are within two percentage points of 
the observed outcomes; and for the continuous variables, all updated simulations are within 0.6 
(log) of the observed outcomes.   
Table 5a provides baseline behavior obtained using the estimated model and updating all 
explanatory endogenous variables (the table reports Medicaid enrollment and assets and gifts 
only).  This simulated behavior is categorized by individuals’ observed marital status and asset 




percentiles of the asset distribution of married individuals (i.e., cutoffs of $0, $15,000, and 
$150,000) and the 20
th, 50
th, and 80
th percentiles of the asset distribution of singles (i.e., cutoffs 
of $0, $10,000, and $100,000).  The pattern of results is identical to that found in the observed 
data: single persons are more likely to have Medicaid coverage than married persons, they are 
less likely to save and gift, and their asset holdings are smaller.  Average asset levels of all 
individuals increase over time in each category.
31  However, the probability of positive assets 
falls.
32     
                                                      
30Right-hand side variables that must be updated are the endogenous right-hand side variables, Medicaid eligibility 
status, and the difference between lag assets and the Medicaid asset limits.  Predictions by mass point do not include 
updates of the right-hand side variables.    
31The latter result is also evident in the observed data, and initially may appear to contract the traditional life-cycle 
model prediction that elderly persons decrease assets over time.  We do not deflate dollar values in the analysis due 
to the fact that asset and income values must be compared to the nominal dollar limits set by each state each year.  
However, we examined the real value of assets among those individuals who are alive all years in our data, and asset 
levels are a bit more constant between 1998 and 2000, but indicate increases between 1995 and 1998. In addition to   33
We then introduce changes in various Medicaid policies and re-evaluate behavior over time (to 
be compared with the baseline).  In Table 5b, Medicaid asset and spousal protection limits for 
nursing home coverage are doubled in each period (Simulation 1).  These institutional changes 
alter some of the Medicaid policy variables in our analysis.  In particular, Medicaid NH 
Generosity and Eligibility increase, and the individual-specific dollar loss necessary for 
Medicaid eligibility (NH $ Loss) decreases.  The average simulated behavioral outcomes are also 
categorized by the 1993 marital status and asset category to determine how behavior differs by 
these characteristics.          
Medicaid enrollment increases in all years, but the increase is small (between 0.1 and 1.6 
percentage points).  Single persons have increases in enrollment that are equal to or greater than 
married persons in the same asset categories.  The increase in enrollment probabilities increases 
over time, for all marital status-asset combinations.  These relatively small increases in Medicaid 
enrollment suggest that other influences, such as welfare aversion and/or bequest motives, create 
disincentives for Medicaid participation.  The simulated increase in nursing home asset limits 
results in higher asset levels and no significant change in gift levels.  These results are consistent 
with the coefficient estimates in Table 3.  Again we theorize that increases in Medicaid nursing 
home generosity and decreases in the individual dollar loss required for eligibility lead to 
increases in assets because as people are allowed to hold more assets under Medicaid coverage, 
they will choose to do so.  This theory is reinforced by the fact that although persons in the 
‘high’ asset category increase assets by the largest dollar amount, by 1998 and 2000 persons in 
the zero and low asset categories have larger percentage increases in assets than those in the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the large increases in stock market value during these years, we believe this result occurs in the full sample because 
individuals with the lowest wealth also have the poorest health, on average.  Thus as persons who are poorest in 
health decease, the average asset levels for the living increase.    
32We should also note that it has been reported that there is more measurement error in the 1993 AHEAD asset data 
than in subsequent waves.  Since our categorization is based on 1993 assets, the asset increases over time may 
reflect better measurement of assets in later years.      34
‘high’ category; this result holds for both single and married persons. 
In the next simulation the asset and spousal protection limits for Medicaid coverage of home- 
and community-cased services (HCBS) are doubled (Table 8c, Simulation 2).  These increases 
cause average HCBS $ Allowable to increase and the individual-specific dollar loss necessary 
for eligibility to decrease.  Although federal law requires spousal protections for nursing home 
care, it is an option for HCBS coverage.  Thus these simulations are expected to have a larger 
impact on the predicted outcomes, since as seen in Appendix Table A2, many states do not have 
spousal protection limits under HCBS coverage.     
The results are consistent with the point estimates – the increased generosity of Medicaid 
eligibility rules for HCBS coverage leads to decreases in Medicaid enrollment and asset levels in 
all categories.  However we must recall that the variables increased by this simulation, HCBS $ 
Allowable and HCBS $ loss, were insignificantly related to both Medicaid enrollment and the 
probability of formal care use.  Thus only the simulated changes in asset levels should be 
considered robust, and these indicate a spend-down behavior to obtain HCBS eligibility when the 
eligibility rules are more generous. 
Based on the point estimates in Table 3, the long-term care spending ratio is significantly 
related to assets and gifts, and is also significantly positively related to Medicaid enrollment and 
the probability of paid home care use is the long-term care spending ratio.  We simulated a fifty 
percent increase in this ratio for each state (Table 8d, Simulation 3).  Medicaid enrollment 
increases, although by less than one percentage point in all categories.  In 1995, 1998, and 2000 
asset levels decrease between 3.3% and 4.9%; 5.1% and 7.2%; and 6.5% and 8.9%, respectively.  
VII.  Conclusion 
The national budget released by the Bush administration in February 2006 proposes to reduce 
Medicaid spending by about $60 billion over the next decade.  Included in that plan are measures   35
expected to reduce assets transfers by the middle- and upper-class elderly who may try to 
impoverish themselves in order to receive Medicaid coverage of long-term care.  Our goal was to 
use existing data on Medicaid and assets to gain an understanding of how differences in 
Medicaid rules across states and time influence utilization and costs.  Therefore, we undertook a 
comprehensive analysis of elderly persons’ insurance, health, long-term care and savings 
decisions over time.      
Our results indicate that Medicaid enrollment is significantly related to more generous 
eligibility requirements for nursing home care, higher number of beds per elderly within a state, 
and smaller differences between Medicaid payment rates to nursing home and the private-pay 
costs.  In states where people are allowed to qualify for Medicaid nursing home coverage while 
holding more wealth, they will choose to hold more assets. 
Our results also indicate that higher levels of state spending on mandatory and personal care, 
relative to nursing home care, are positively related to Medicaid enrollment and receipt of formal 
home care, and negatively related to assets.  Medicaid eligibility rules for HCBS had no effect on 
Medicaid enrollment, but were significantly related to lower asset levels, suggesting that people 
may spend-down for HCBS coverage.   
Given our estimated dynamic structural model we conducted several simulations in order to 
investigate the impacts of the policy variables on behavior over time.  Doubling Medicaid 
eligibility limits for nursing home coverage increases Medicaid enrollment only slightly.  This 
increase in Medicaid eligibility generosity results in higher asset levels, but lower probabilities of 
any assets, suggesting that people do modify savings behavior in response to Medicaid limits.  In 
contrast, increases in asset limits for Medicaid coverage of HCBS cause asset levels to decrease, 
suggesting a spend-down effect.    
We conclude that the generosities of Medicaid policy structures do influence elderly persons   36
decisions on whether to enroll in Medicaid for long-term care coverage; including eligibility 
policies, HCBS services offered, home care spending, restrictions on construction of nursing 
home beds, and reimbursement rates to nursing homes.  As the new asset transfer rules in the 
Deficit Reduction Act are implemented across all states, elderly persons must be careful of any 
asset transfers made up to at least five years before their health deteriorates to where they need 
long-term care and perhaps Medicaid coverage.      
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics, by Discrete Health Categorization 
     1995    1998    2000  





















                 
Endogenous Variables
2,3                
                   
3 = i
t d   On  Medicaid  8  16 30   7  14 31   8  16 30 
2 , 1 , 0 , = i
i
t d   Supplemental Insurance  
    If not on Medicaid 
               
  Medicare  Only  25 24 24    30 28 26    31 30 27 
  Private Insurance No LTC  58  55  42    54  52  39    52  48  40 
  Private Insurance with LTC  9  5  4    8  6  4    8  6  3 
                   
t h   Health  Index  0.30 2.92 4.11  0.31 2.97 4.16  0.26 2.92 4.17 
) ( 1 H t h p = +   Death   11.0  8.0  8.4  10.2 14.1 25.7   8.1  15.6 34.2 
                   
3 , 2 , 1 , 0 , = k
k
t d   LTC Arrangement                 
  No  LTC  92 63 14    89 51 12    91 59 14 
  Unpaid Home Care  4  27  42    4  29  29    6  17  22 
  Paid Home Care  1  5  20    1  10  24    2  8  21 
  Nursing  Home  3  5 23    6  9 35    2 16 44 
                   
) 0 ( >
u





t A A   Unprotected Assets (000's)  291 157 144   347 244 217   446 289 245 
) 0 ( >
g





t A A   Gifts (000's)  9.2  11.6 11.2  68.1 15.0 46.2  16.7 97.2 191.5 
                   
Exogenous Variables                 
t X   Female   60 68 71    60 67 74    62 70 70 
  Non-Caucasian    13 16 21    12 15 20    12 14 20 
  Hispanic    5 6 6    5 5 8    5 6 7 
  No High School Degree   38  49  61    35  47  60    34  42  56 
  High  School  Graduate  32 28 22    33 29 24    34 31 24 
  Some  College  16 13 9    17 14 9    18 16 11 
  College  Graduate  13  9  8  14  10  7  14  11  9 
  Single  45 57 66    42 55 69    53 64 69 
  Age    78 81 83    80 82 85    81 84 85 
  Number of Children  2.5  2.6  2.6    2.8  2.8  2.8    2.9  2.8  2.8 
                   
1 Health categorizations: Good: No ADL difficulties and less than 3 IADL difficulties; Fair: Either a) No ADL  
   difficulties and difficulty with 3 or more IADLs; or b) difficulty with 1 or 2 ADLs and less than 3 IADL difficulties;    
   Poor: Either a) Difficulty with 3 or more ADLs or b) Difficulty with 1 or 2 ADLs and 3 or more IADLs. 
2 Numbers represent percent of the sample in each category in most cases.  Means are reported for health index,  
   assets if any and gifts if any , and for age and number of children. 
3 Appendix Table A5 lists and defines right-hand side variables constructed from the endogenous variables.   38
Table 2.  Medicaid Policy Variables 






   
NH Generosity  
   
 
 








HCBS $ Loss 
   
   
 
Indicator = 1 if individual has Medicaid coverage in the current period. 
 
Average probability of eligibility for Medicaid coverage of nursing home care for a marital 
status/age/education cell. 
 
The product of average Medicaid eligibility probability within a state for a marital 
status/age/education cell and the average cost of nursing home care in the state for two years. 
 
Individual quantity of assets above eligibility limits for obtaining Medicaid eligibility for nursing 
home care, based on assets in the previous period and Medicaid eligibility policies in state of 
residence. 
 
Average dollar amount of income and assets one may retain while receiving Medicaid HCBS 
coverage within a state, for a marital status/age/education cell. 
 
Average dollar loss in assets necessary to obtain Medicaid HCBS coverage within a state for a 
marital status/age/education cell. 
Supply-Side Variables:   
   
Beds/1000 Elderly  Number of Nursing Home beds per 1000 Elderly. 
NH Revenue Loss  Amount of lost revenue to a nursing home from accepting the Medicaid payment rate for a patient 
rather than the private pay rate (over two years). 
HH+Personal $ / NH $  State’s ratio of total Medicaid dollars spent on Mandatory Home Care and Optional Personal care 
to total dollars spent on Nursing Home care. 
HCBS $ /Elig. Elderly  Amount of spending on optional home- and community-based waivers for the elderly per eligible 
elderly. An elderly person is eligible if enrolled in SSI. Not all those eligible are enrolled. 
Medicare $ Change  Change in average per-patient Medicare payment to home health agencies as part of the BBA 
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Table 3a.  Selected Parameter Estimates from the Equation System with Heterogeneity  
                 Outcome: Medicaid, Health Insurance, and Long-Term Care Arrangement 
   Other  Insurance Long-Term Care Arrangement
Explanatory Variables  Medicaid Private Private Informal Formal Nursing
   No  LTC w/ LTC Care Care Home
    
NH Generosity/10000 0.072 -0.069 -0.148 -0.004 0.005  0.044
  (0.021) (0.012) (0.025) (0.028) (0.039)  (0.034)
ln(NH $ Loss)  0.014  -0.030 0.022  -0.017 -0.044   -0.020
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.037) (0.015) (0.021)  (0.019)
HCBS $ Allowable    -0.041  -0.006 0.031 0.085 -0.079  0.122
  (0.067) (0.040) (0.071) (0.068) (0.074)  (0.078)
ln(HCBS $ Loss)   0.008  -0.014  -0.048 0.008 0.040  0.006
  (0.021) (0.010) (0.025) (0.016) (0.023)  (0.020)
(Beds/1000 Elderly)/10 0.034 0.140 0.198   -0.008 -0.013  0.046
  (0.022) (0.014) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029)  (0.023)
NH Revenue Loss/10000    -0.066  -0.008  -0.030 0.006 -0.012   -0.011
  (0.023) (0.015) (0.031) (0.024) (0.032)  (0.026)
HH + Personal $ / NH $  0.037 0.045  -0.012  -0.038 0.152  0.013
  (0.027) (0.018) (0.037) (0.028) (0.036)  (0.032)
HCBS $ / Elig. Elderly / 1000  0.064 0.008  -0.022  -0.015 0.008  0.025
  (0.028) (0.018) (0.035) (0.031) (0.038)  (0.030)
Medicare $ Change  0.102  -0.022 0.034  -0.187 -0.044  0.046
  (0.068) (0.044) (0.079) (0.066) (0.082)  (0.071)
Lag Private Ins. No LTC    -0.899 1.910 1.309  
  (0.083) (0.046) (0.121)  
Lag Private Ins. with LTC    -1.435 1.489 3.807  
  (0.209) (0.082) (0.130)  
Lag Medicaid  2.534 0.300 0.952  
  (0.089) (0.112) (0.272)  
Lag Health  0.234 0.045 0.014  
  (0.019) (0.014) (0.028)  
Lag Assets    -0.391 0.423  -1.396  -0.388 -0.181   -0.631
  (0.240) (0.258) (0.951) (0.275) (0.335)  (0.312)
Lag Assets Squared 0.031   -0.165 0.776 0.179 0.105  0.327
  (0.109) (0.122) (0.468) (0.129) (0.157)  (0.147)
Medicaid Eligibility     -0.291  -0.389  
   (0.156) (0.321)  
Private Ins. No LTC     -0.035 0.135   -0.071
   (0.071) (0.104)  (0.089)
Private Ins. With LTC     -0.068 -0.276  0.352
   (0.146) (0.233)  (0.164)
Medicaid   0.079 1.026  1.395
   (0.101) (0.133)  (0.118)
Health   1.196 1.622  1.247
   (0.025) (0.037)  (0.031)
Health * Health Improved   0.405 0.350  0.481
    (0.056) (0.082)  (0.064)
Health * Health Declined a little    0.039 -0.024    -0.002
    (0.031) (0.037)  (0.035)
Health * Health Declined a lot     -0.096 -0.168   -0.153
    (0.023) (0.029)  (0.027)
    
Note:  Other Health Insurance is relative to Medicare only; LTC arrangement is relative to no care. 
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Table 3b. Selected Parameter Estimates from the Equation System with Heterogeneity 
                 Outcomes:  Probability of Any Assets and Gifts, Continuous Assets and Gifts if any 
Explanatory Variables  Any Any  Ln(Assets)  Ln(Gifts) 
  Assets  Gifts  If any  If any 
   
NH Generosity/10000  0.079     -0.001  0.043        -0.006 
 (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
ln(NH $ Loss)   0.026     -0.025  0.021        -0.011 
 (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
HCBS $ Allowable  0.113  0.242       -0.069  0.010 
 (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.025)  (0.028) 
ln(HCBS $ Loss)       -0.026  0.026       -0.029  0.001 
 (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
(Beds/1000 Elderly)/10     -0.028  0.126       -0.013        -0.010 
 (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
NH Revenue Loss/10000  0.007     -0.170       -0.062        -0.021 
 (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
HH + Personal $ / NH $     -0.062  0.023       -0.057        -0.027 
 (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
HCBS $ / Elig. Elderly / 1000  0.006     -0.001       -0.010        -0.004 
 (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Medicare $ Change  0.054     -0.279  0.005  0.010 
 (0.061)  (0.054)  (0.025)  (0.028) 
Private Ins. No LTC  0.468  0.466  0.174  0.095 
 (0.076)  (0.074)  (0.028)  (0.035) 
Private Ins. With LTC  0.602  0.994  0.293  0.133 
 (0.183)  (0.147)  (0.048)  (0.057) 
Medicaid     -0.761     -1.367       -0.809  0.083 
 (0.091)  (0.133)  (0.049)  (0.073) 
Health     -0.186     -0.170       -0.037  0.059 
 (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
Lag Assets  0.988  0.990 1.564  0.524 
 (0.223)  (0.291)  (0.125)  (0.196) 
Lag Assets Squared     -0.330     -0.397       -0.491        -0.226 
 (0.102)  (0.139)  (0.060)  (0.095) 
Health * Health Improved     -0.198     -0.205       -0.080  0.012 
 (0.058)  (0.070)  (0.034)  (0.045) 
Health * Health Declined a little     -0.028  0.032  0.054        -0.012 
 (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.022) 
Health * Health Declined a lot  0.004  0.050  0.043        -0.001 
 (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
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Table 3c. Selected Parameter Estimates from the Equation System with Heterogeneity 
                Outcomes: Continuous Health Index and Probability of Death 
Explanatory Variables  Level of Health  Prob. Of Death 
    
Lag Private Ins. No LTC  -0.048   
 (0.025)   
Lag Private Ins. With LTC              -0.113   
 (0.038)   
Lag Medicaid  0.121   
 (0.037)   
Lag Health  0.484   
 (0.009)   
Lag Informal Home Care              -0.057   
 (0.075)   
Lag Formal Home Care  0.282   
 (0.214)   
Lag Nursing Home Care  0.653   
 (0.129)   
Lag Health * Lag Informal Care  0.126   
 (0.024)   
Lag Health * Lag Formal Care  0.123   
 (0.056)   
Lag Health * Lag NH Care  0.040   
 (0.036)   
Private Ins. No LTC    0.154 
   (0.073) 
Private Ins. With LTC    0.167 
   (0.135) 
Medicaid   0.053 
   (0.100) 
Health   0.141 
   (0.036) 
Informal Home Care    3.770 
   (0.189) 
Formal Home Care    3.617 
   (0.328) 
Nursing Home    2.498 
   (0.155) 
Health * Informal Care                   -0.736 
   (0.067) 
Health * Formal Care                   -0.473 
   (0.093) 
Health * NH Care                   -0.114 
   (0.053) 
Health * Health Improved    0.771 
   (0.053) 
Health * Health Declined a little    0.051 
   (0.028) 
Health * Health Declined a lot                   -0.042 
   (0.026) 
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Table 4.  Observed Data and Model Predictions by Year and by Unobserved Heterogeneity Mass Point  
Year  Medicaid 
Supplemental 








if any  Deceased 
 Yes  None  PN  PY    None  IC  FC  Yes  Yes  (Log)  Yes  (Log)  Yes 
1995                       
Observed 12.0  24.7  55.8  7.5  1.21  77.4  13.1  3.9  5.6  85.3  9.16  48.4  3.74 10.2 
Simulated
1   11.9  25.1  55.5  7.5  1.21  77.4  13.1  3.9  5.6  85.3  9.15  47.9  3.70 10.1 
Simulated
2 11.9 25.1  55.5  7.5  1.21 76.7  13.5  3.8  6.0 84.9  9.08  47.0  3.64 14.4 
Permanent                      
Mass Point 1  9.2  20.7  60.9  9.2  0.94  79.1  14.9  4.9  1.1  94.1  11.47  99.9  10.97 8.3 
Mass Point 2  11.5  23.9  56.5  8.1  1.10  78.6  13.4  4.2  3.7  89.0  9.93  84.4  7.30 9.4 
Mass Point 3  11.7  24.8  55.7  7.7  1.19  77.7  13.2  4.0  5.2  86.2  9.30  55.6  4.22 10.0 
Mass Point 4  12.3  26.2  54.5  7.0  1.29  76.3  12.8  3.6  7.3  82.2  8.52  17.4  1.13 10.6 
T i m e - V a r y i   n g                      
Mass Point 1  13.7  23.7  55.5  7.0  1.28  80.2  12.4  3.2  4.2  90.9  9.69  61.8  4.50 6.4 
Mass Point 2  8.6  27.5  55.4  8.4  1.08  72.4  14.4  5.1  8.0  75.5  8.20  23.1  2.26 16.7 
1998                      
Observed 12.8  29.2  51.1  7.0  1.45  69.1  12.5  6.9  11.5  85.8  9.31  47.4  3.84 13.6 
Simulated
1   12.8  29.1  51.1  7.0  1.45  69.0  12.6  7.1  11.4  86.2  9.32  46.7  3.75 13.4 
Simulated
2 12.7 28.4  48.8  10.1 1.35 70.7  11.5  5.9  11.8 81.9  8.88  43.7  3.52 14.9 
Permanent                      
Mass Point 1  11.6  25.8  53.8  8.8  1.20  71.9  15.8  8.9  3.4  94.8  11.54  99.9  11.20 10.9 
Mass Point 2  12.1  28.2  52.0  7.7  1.34  71.0  13.4  7.7  7.9  89.6  10.07  83.2  7.45 12.5 
Mass Point 3  12.7  28.8  51.4  7.1  1.43  69.3  12.8  7.2  10.6  86.9  9.45  54.1  4.27 13.3 
Mass Point 4  13.3  30.2  50.1  6.5  1.53  67.4  11.7  6.6  14.2  83.2  8.72  16.8  1.14 14.0 
Time-Varying                        
Mass Point 1  14.7  27.7  51.1  6.5  1.52  72.2  12.4  6.3  9.1  91.3  9.81  60.4  4.58 8.9 
Mass Point 2  9.3  31.8  51.1  7.8  1.31  63.3  12.9  8.6  15.3  77.1  8.46  22.6  2.27 21.3 
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Table 4.  Observed Data and Model Predictions by Year and by Unobserved Heterogeneity Mass Point -- continued 
Year  Medicaid 
Supplemental 








if any  Deceased 
 Yes  None  PN  PY    None  IC  FC  Yes  Yes  (Log)  Yes  (Log)  Yes 
2000                         
Observed 14.3  30.2  49.0  6.5  1.57  68.9  10.9  6.9  13.5  84.1  9.23  47.5  3.87  14.9 
Simulated
1   14.2  30.0  49.3  6.4  1.57  68.4  11.1  7.0  13.5  84.3  9.24  46.3  3.75  14.6 
Simulated
2 14.7 28.3  46.5  10.5 1.52 69.9  9.6  6.8  13.7 77.4  8.59  41.6  3.38  16.1 
Permanent                      
Mass Point 1  12.9  29.2  49.4  8.5  1.32  72.5  12.9  9.8  4.6  93.6  11.48  99.9  11.21 12.0 
Mass Point 2  13.6  28.7  50.6  7.1  1.45  70.9  12.1  7.8  9.2  88.1  10.01  82.7  7.42 13.5 
Mass Point 3  14.1  29.9  49.5  6.5  1.56  68.8  11.3  7.3  12.7  85.1  9.38  53.6  4.27 14.4 
Mass Point 4  14.8  31.0  48.3  6.0  1.65  66.7  10.2  6.1  17.0  81.1  8.63  16.9  1.17 15.2 
Time-Varying                        
Mass Point 1  16.4  28.5  49.1  6.0  1.65  71.8  11.0  6.2  11.0  89.9  9.78  59.9  4.57 9.6 
Mass Point 2  10.5  32.7  49.7  7.2  1.44  62.5  11.1  8.5  17.9  74.4  8.30  22.4  2.28 23.3 
Estimated Heterogeneity Distribution               
 Estimated    Transformed    Estimated    Transformed   
  Mass Point    Mass Point    Prob Weight    Prob Weight   
Permanent                     
Mass Point 1  0.000  (0.000)    0.000    3.465  (0.351)    0.004   
Mass Point 2  0.128  (0.110)    0.532    5.067  (0.428)    0.118   
Mass Point 3  1.097  (0.101)    0.750    4.385  (0.459)    0.584   
Mass Point 4  1.000  (0.000)    1.000    –   –     0.295   
T i m e - V a   r y i n g                 
Mass Point 1  0.000  (0.000)    0.000    -0.569  (0.023)    0.639   
Mass Point 2  1.000  (0.000)    1.000    –   –     0.361   
                  
1 Simulated outcomes are based on the model estimates, random error draws, and observed values of all explanatory variables. 
2 Simulated outcomes are based on the model estimates, random error draws, and updated values of the endogenous explanatory variables.  
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Table 5a.  Baseline Simulated Outcomes 
                  categorized by 1993 observed marital status and asset level 
 Married Single 
  Asset Category  Asset Category 
 Zero  Low  Medium  High  Zero Low  Medium  High 
1995                
Medicaid 27.2  10.7  2.2  1.1  42.1  24.2  6.1  2.5 
Positive Assets  58.2  87.0  95.7  98.3  45.2  76.1  90.9  95.8 
Assets 15,681  41,913  212,983  994,092  8,269  17,493  103,848  525,793 
Positive Gifts  30.7  43.5  56.9  70.5  21.1  29.2  44.9  57.7 
Gifts 1,783  3,030  4,452  7,449  1,218  1,626  3,057  5,618 
1998               
Medicaid 26.1  11.2  3.6  1.6  41.8  26.5  9.5  4.2 
Positive Assets  62.9  83.5  93.1  97.0  45.8  66.3  84.5  91.6 
Assets 50,726  113,048  380,449  1,158,260  21,619  40,893  176,073  580,596 
Positive Gifts  27.5  41.5  54.2  66.0  16.9  25.6  40.3  51.5 
Gifts 2,951  3,790  5,765  9,602  1,448  2,089  3,879  6,495 
2000                
Medicaid 28.0  13.5  5.6  2.7  43.7  29.7  13.0  7.1 
Positive Assets  60.3  78.6  89.2  94.5  42.0  58.2  77.4  86.1 
Assets 119,732  231,265  571,891  1,346,587  41,281  84,066  251,385  623,793 
Positive Gifts  26.5  39.2  50.5  62.5  17.1  24.1  37.5  47.9 
Gifts 3,045  4,126  6,010  9,183  1,594  2,284  3,896  6,377 
Asset Categories.  Zero: $0; Low: [$1,$10,000] for singles, [$1, $15,000] for marrieds; Medium: [$10,000,$100,000]   
                            for singles, [$15,001,$150,000] for marrieds; High: >$100,000 for singles , >$150,000 for marrieds. 
 
Table 5b.  Policy Simulation 1:  Asset limits for nursing home eligibility are doubled 
                                                       categorized by 1993 observed marital status and asset level 
 Married  Single 
  Asset Category  Asset Category 
 Zero  Low  Medium  High  Zero Low  Medium  High 
1995             
Medicaid  27.8  11.1  2.2  1.1 42.9 24.5  6.3  2.6 
Positive  Assets  59.1  87.4 95.6  98.4 46.3 76.3 91.3  96.0 
Assets 16,331  43,331  203,047  1,020,061  8,627  17,310  106,833  539,344 
Positive  Gifts  30.5  43.4 57.6  70.4 21.0 29.5 44.9  57.6 
Gifts  1,768  3,005 4,681  7,434 1,208 1,664 3,047  5,580 
1998                
Medicaid  27.0  11.8  3.9  1.7 42.8 27.1  9.8  4.4 
Positive  Assets  63.9  84.2 93.3  97.2 46.8 66.8 85.1  91.9 
Assets 55,130  120,166  383,930  1,221,860  22,994  41,473  182,474  595,745 
Positive  Gifts  27.5  41.4 53.8  65.9 16.9 25.4 40.3  51.5 
Gifts  2,928  3,755 5,680  9,532 1,456 2,070 3,861  6,478 
2000             
Medicaid  29.4  14.4  6.0  3.0 45.3 31.3 13.8  7.6 
Positive  Assets  61.6  79.6 89.8  94.9 43.5 59.3 78.4  86.8 
Assets 129,547  250,036  597,453  1,438,140  44,931  88,582  268,230  654,717 
Positive  Gifts  26.4  39.1 50.3  62.4 17.1 23.9 37.4  47.8 
Gifts  3,019  4,100 5,948  9,142 1,584 2,267 3,866  6,352 
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Table 5c.  Policy Simulation 2:  Asset limits for paid home care eligibility are doubled 
                                                       categorized by 1993 observed marital status and asset level 
 Married  Single 
  Asset Category  Asset Category 
 Zero  Low  Medium  High  Zero Low  Medium  High 
1995              
Medicaid  27.0  10.6 2.2  1.1  41.6  23.6 5.9  2.4 
Positive  Assets  59.2  87.7 96.0  98.4  47.2  78.3 91.7  96.3 
Assets 15,282  43,067  209,620  965,119  7,948  17,836  97,286  480,336 
Positive  Gifts  31.9  44.4 58.0  71.7  23.2  31.2 47.8  61.0 
Gifts  1,858  3,104 4,586  7,626  1,337  1,751 3,289  6,092 
1998               
Medicaid  25.3  10.7 3.4  1.5  40.6  25.3 8.9  4.0 
Positive  Assets  65.5  85.5 94.0  97.4  48.8  69.7 86.4  92.9 
Assets  46,279  106,539 346,738 1,049,395  19,784  37,365 149,147  493,299 
Positive  Gifts  30.5  44.8 57.1  68.5  19.3  28.9 43.9  55.5 
Gifts  3,161  4,059 6,119 10,094  1,634  2,337 4,265  7,086 
2000              
Medicaid 26.2  12.4  5.0  2.5  41.4  27.4  11.9  6.3 
Positive  Assets  65.6  82.3 91.4  95.7  47.6  64.4 81.8  90.0 
Assets  88,332  183,997 440,803 1,059,193  31,883  60,992 177,076  441,691 
Positive  Gifts  32.9  45.6 56.5 
 
67.6  22.6  31.2 45.5  56.6 
Gifts  3,549  4,842 6,774 10,060  2,013  2,816 4,794  7,616 
Table 5d.  Policy Simulation 3:  Long-Term Care Spending Ratio Increased 50 Percent 
                                                       categorized by 1993 observed marital status and asset level 
 Married  Single 
  Asset Category  Asset Category 
 Zero  Low  Medium  High  Zero Low  Medium  High 
1995             
Medicaid  27.6  10.9 2.3  1.1  42.5  24.5 6.2  2.6 
Positive  Assets  57.3  86.5 95.5  98.3 44.2  75.4 90.6  95.7 
Assets 14,889  40,214  204,718  961,218  7,820  16,749  99,987  508,002 
Positive  Gifts  30.8  43.7 57.1  70.6 21.3  29.3 45.1  57.8 
Gifts  1,752  2,988 4,391  7,344 1,198  1,602 3,019  5,539 
1998              
Medicaid  26.6  11.5 3.8  1.7  42.6  26.9 9.7  4.3 
Positive  Assets  61.7  82.9 92.8  96.9 44.4  65.3 83.9  91.3 
Assets  46,802  105,837 357,818 1,098,890  20,057 38,067 165,182  550,301 
Positive  Gifts  27.4  41.5 54.2  66.1 16.8  25.6 40.3  51.5 
Gifts  2,869  3,711 5,669  9,440 1,412  2,045 3,794  6,365 
2000             
Medicaid 28.8  13.9  5.8  2.9  44.7  30.3  13.5  7.3 
Positive  Assets  59.0  77.7 88.6  94.2 40.5  56.9 76.4  85.4 
Assets  108,564  213,136 530,381 1,259,167  37,335 77,960 231,692  580,821 
Positive  Gifts  26.3  39.1 50.5  62.5 16.9  24.0 37.4  47.9 
Gifts  2,933  4,037 5,888  8,991 1,514  2,222 3,795  6,233 






Identification in a system of dynamic equations such as this appears difficult to assess 
at first glance.  However, most of the model is identified using the structure of the 
equations imposed by the theoretical model.  For example, lagged values of endogenous 
outcomes enter almost all equations in the system (except the initial conditions, which 
will be discussed separately below).  These lagged values serve as exclusion restrictions, 
but also contain other lagged values and additional lags by construction.  Hence there is a 
great deal of variation in these lags and their determinants that serve to identify the 
model.   
Because the initial conditions do not contain lagged values (due to lack of data), 
separate variables that represent sources of exogenous variation must be included.  These 
variables should be significant in the initial equations, but, conditional on the lagged 
values of the state variables, the variables used as exclusions in the initial equations 
should not be significant in the period  t>0 equations.
33  The coefficients on the exclusion 
restrictions were significantly different from zero and the variables, in most cases, were 
not significant in the main equations of the model.  Additionally, the model is identified 
by the nonlinearities in the functional form of included variables and the covariance 
restrictions on the error terms.     
In the first period of data used in this analysis, no institutionalized persons are 
interviewed.  Although the initial conditions are estimated jointly with the structural 
equations in the empirical model, theoretically the fact that there are no institutionalized 
persons sampled in the first period could bias estimates because of selection.  However, 
the average stay in a nursing home is quite short.  Of the 384 persons who entered a 
nursing home between 1993 and 1995, 41% had deceased by 1995 and 89% had deceased 






                                                      
33 Variables used for identification of the initial conditions are in Table A4 of Appendix A.  Coefficient 
estimates are available upon request. 
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Table A1.  Medicaid Eligibility Limits for the Aged by State, 1998  
  Categorically Needy    Medically Needy 
  Income Limits  Asset Limits    Income Limits   Asset Limits 
State  HCBS       NH      HCBS        NH   
Alabama   494  1,482 2,000 --- ---  --- 
Arizona   1,482  1,482 2,000 --- ---  --- 
Arkansas    1,482 1,482 2,000 108 --- 2,000 
California   650  650 2,000 600 600  2,000 
Colorado   1,482  1,482 2,000 --- ---  --- 
Connecticut
b    1,482 1,482 1,600 476 476 1,600 
District of Columbia     ---  512 2,000 377 377  2,600 
Florida    1,482 1,482 5,000 180 N/A 5,000 
Georgia    1,482 1,482 2,000 317 317 2,000 
Idaho   1,482  1,482 2,000 --- ---  --- 
Illinois
b   554  283 2,000 283 283  2,000 
Indiana
b 494 494 1,500 494 494  1,500 
Iowa   1,482  1,482 2,000 483 N/A  10,000 
Kansas    1,482 1,482 2,000 475 475 2,000 
Louisiana    1,482 1,482 2,000 N/A 100 2,000 
Maryland    988 1,482 2,000 350 350 2,500 
Massachusetts   651  623 2,000 651 651  2,000 
Michigan    1,482 1,482 2,000 408 408 2,000 
Minnesota
b    1,482 1,482 3,000 467 467 3,000 
Missouri
b   932  932 999.99 494 821  999.99 
Nebraska   651  502 4,000 392 392  4,000 
New Hampshire
b,c    1,165 1,165 1,500 508 508 2,500 
New Jersey
 c    1,482 1,482 2,000 367 --- 4,000 
New Mexico   1,270  1,270 2,000 --- ---  --- 
New York   580  580 2,000 584 584  3,500 
North Carolina   651  494 2,000 242 242  1,500 
Ohio
b    427 1,281 1,500 427 427 1,500 
Oregon    1,482 1,482 2,000 N/A N/A 5,000 
Pennsylvania
c    1,482 1,482 2,400 425 425 2,400 
South Carolina   1,482  1,482 2,000 --- ---  --- 
Tennessee    1,482 1,482 2,000 175 175 2,000 
Texas   1,482  1,482 2,000 N/A N/A  N/A 
Virginia
b    1,482 1,482 2,000 250 250 2,000 
Washington    1,482 1,482 2,000 521 521 2,000 
West Virginia   1,482  1,482 2,000 200 200  2,000 
Wisconsin    1,482 1,482 2,000 578 578 2,000 
Wyoming   1,482  1,482 2,000   --- ---  --- 
Sources: NASMD; Bruen et al., correspondence with state Medicaid offices; Kassner et al., 2000. 
Note: The 1998 federal poverty level (FPL) is $8,050 for one person (Source: Federal Register, 1998).   
a) Comm = Living in the community with a HCBS Waiver; NH = Residence in a nursing home. 
b) These are 209(b) states.  If they do not have a medically needy program they must allow spend   
    down to their categorically needy income limits.  
b) Connecticut and Virginia have income limits that vary by region.   
c) These states have different asset limits for NH and HCBS eligibility. Ones shown are for NH; for  
     HCBS, the limits are: New Hampshire – $1,500; New Jersey – $2,000; and Pennsylvania – $2,000.  
d) Limits with ‘N/A’ have a medically needy program, but it does not cover the indicated service. 
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Table A2.  Maintenance Needs Allowances and Spousal Protection Limits 
   MNA
1 Spousal Protection Limits 
   Assets Income 
   Minimum  Maximum     
State   HCBS    Nursing    HCBS     Nursing    HCBS   Nursing  HCBS 
Alabama   562  25,000 0 25,000 0 1,295  0
Arizona   1,410  15,347 15,347 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Arkansas   1,410  76,740 0 76,740 0 1,919  0
California   600  76,740 76,740 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Colorado   1,410  15,347 0 76,740 0 1,919  0
Connecticut 1,254  15,347 15,347 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
District of Columbia  0  15,347 0 15,347 0 1,919  0
Florida   1,410  76,740 0 76,740 0 1,919  0
Georgia   470  76,740 76,740 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Idaho   530  15,347 15,347 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Illinois 283  76,740 76,740 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Indiana 470  15,347 0 15,347 0 1,919  0
Iowa   1,410  21,169 21,169 76,740 76,740 1,919  0
Kansas   627  15,347 15,347 15,347 15,347 1,919  1,919
Louisiana   1,410  76,740 76,740 76,740 76,740 1,919  0
Maryland   350  76,740 0 76,740 0 1,919  0
Massachusetts   627  76,740 0 76,740 0 1,919  0
Michigan   1,410  76,740 76,740 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Minnesota 467  24,247 24,247 24,247 24,247 1,919  1,919
Missouri 863  15,347 15,347 15,347 15,347 1,919  0
Nebraska   392  15,347 15,347 15,347 15,347 1,295  1,295
New Hampshire  508  15,347 0 15,347 0 1,919  0
New Jersey
  1,410 15,347 15,347 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
New Mexico   1,207  27,600 27,600 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
New York   584  70,000 70,000 70,000 70,000 1,919  1,919
North Carolina   242  15,347 15,347 15,347 15,347 1,919  0
Ohio 964  15,347 15,347 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Oregon   476  15,347 15,347 76,740 76,740 1,295  1,295
Pennsylvania 502  15,347 0 15,347 0 1,919  0
South Carolina   1,410  66,480 66,480 66,480 66,480 1,479  1,479
Tennessee   940  15,347 15,347 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Texas   1,410  15,347 15,347 76,740 15,347 1,919  0
Virginia 470  76,740 76,740 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Washington   627  76,740 76,740 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
West Virginia   1,410  76,740 0 76,740 0 1,919  0
Wisconsin   710  44,103 44,103 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Wyoming   1,410  76,740 76,740 76,740 76,740 1,919  1,919
Sources: National Association of State Medicaid Directors (NASMD), 2000; Kassner et al., 2000;  
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Table A3. Supply-Side Policy Variables, 1998 
   Medicaid Average HCBS  Out-of
  Ratio of Medicaid  Number of Nursing S pending per Pocket
S pending: Home to  Beds Per Home Rate Eligible
2 Elderly Nursing Home  
Institutionalization
1 1000 Elderly      Per Day per Year    Cost Per Day
State   (HH+Personal$/NH$)    (Bed/1000 Eld)   (HCBS$/Elig. Elderly) 
Alabama 4    42 101.69 223.42    102.19
Arizona 8    23 91.16 0    130.16
Arkansas 27    64 63.03 1533.3    93.65
California 20    30 83.02 20.38    162.17
Colorado 15    47 98.33 850.59    105.95
Connecticut 13    60 128.03 997.5    230.16
DC 9    30 146.15 0    161.11
Florida 9    27 100.28 182.16    122.75
Georgia 7    50 77.61 246.88    107.54
Idaho 21    42 88.72 258.5    116.69
Illinois 1    69 70.15 1286.59    133.93
Indiana 7    79 81.06 139.87    128.97
Iowa 14    74 80.09 1615.75    92.06
Kansas 9    78 70.80 9403.77    94.44
Louisiana 4    77 60.04 27.53    72.62
Maryland 14    34 104.41 25.71    133.73
Massachusetts 17    58 117.97 123.15    203.97
Michigan 21    37 89.50 52.4    130.16
Minnesota 18    68 107.44 2991.76    145.24
Missouri 14    64 90.47 2967.16    117.06
Nebraska 7    77 83.17 331.14    164.28
New 3    51 109.56 10409.08    149.21
New Jersey 21    39 117.36 252.55    172.22
New Mexico  3    29 132.45 379.15    122.22
New York  43    39 157.00 38.54    182.54
North 26    40 97.87 733.32    115.08
Ohio 2    63 109.23 494.75    152.12
Oregon 11    31 84.68 2299.54    113.89
Pennsylvania 2    48 116.38 325.23    133.35
South 6    35 81.76 453.08    104.36
Tennessee 0    57 104.79 25.77    103.18
Texas 16    56 75.38 441.84    41,425
Virginia 2    33 79.08 687.84    50,405
Washington 24    39 114.38 1476.12    52,722
West Virginia 19    20 115.73 10591.1    47,218
Wisconsin 15    63 89.21 1179.47    49,986
Wyoming 9    57 101.25 771.59    36,500
Sources: Number of Nursing Home Beds: Harrington et al., 2000
               Elderly Population: U.S. Census Bureau.
               Medicaid Nursing Home Payment Rates: Harrington et al., 1999; Bectel et al., 1998 
               HCBS Expenditures per Participant: Home and Community Based Services Resource Network
               Number of Elderly Enrolled in SSI: Green Book (http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/98gb/intro.htm)
               Total Medicaid Spending on Personal Care, Nursing Home Care, and Mandatory Home Care:  
               Costs are from the CNN Money calculator at  
               http://cgi.money.cnn.com/tools/elder_care/elder_care_cost_finder.html  
               and indexed by a medical services price index from  
               http://www.econmagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/blscu/CUUR0000SAM2.
1 This is the ratio of total Medicaid spending on the optional Personal Care program and Mandatory Home 
care to total spending on Nursing Home Care.              
2 These are average HCBS expenditures per eligible elderly, not per elderly participant.  An elderly 
individual is considered eligible if enrolled in Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 
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Table A4. Exclusion Restrictions for Initial Conditions (1993) 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variables 
Insurance Choice    Number of Years Worked 
    Hospitalization in Previous Year Indicator 
    Spouse's Sex Interacted with Spouse's Education Status 
    Type of Job Indicators (nine) 
    Health of the Spouse 
Long-Term Care Choice    Number of grand-children 
    Health of the Spouse 
    Number of Sisters Living 
    Number of Brothers Living 
Health    Mother has 8 or more years of Education Indicator 
    Father has 8 or more years of Education Indicator 
    Age of Mother at her Death 
    Age of Father at his Death 
Assets   Years  Worked 
    Spouse's Sex Interacted with Spouse's Education Status 
    Type of Job Indicators (nine) 
Health of the Spouse 
       
 
 
Table A5. Definition of Selected Endogenous Variables 
Private Insurance No LTC  Indicator = 1 if had private insurance that does not cover long-term care 
Private Insurance With LTC  Indicator = 1 if had private insurance that does cover long-term care 
Medicaid  Indicator = 1 if had Medicaid coverage 
Health  Health (health is worse as number increases) 
Assets  Unprotected Assets (Log)  
Gifts  Gifts (Log)  
Medicaid Eligibility  Indicator = 1 if eligible for Medicaid at the beginning of the period 
Informal Home Care  Indicator = 1 if received unpaid home care at least twice a week 
Formal Home Care  Indicator = 1 if received paid home care at least twice a week 
Nursing Home Resident  Indicator = 1 if living in a Nursing Home 
Health * Health Improved   Health * Indicator = 1 if health improved (Healtht - Healtht-1) < 0) 
Health * Health Declined a little  Health * Indicator = 1 if health declined a little (Healtht – Healtht-1) < 2) 
Health * Health Declined a lot  Health * Indicator = 1 if health declined a lot (Healtht - Healtht-1) >= 2) 
Health * Informal Home Care  Health * Indicator = 1 if received informal home care  
Health * Formal Home Care  Health * Indicator = 1 if received formal home care  
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